THE BOSTON POOR DEBTOR COURT-A STUDY
IN COLLECTION PROCEDURE PETER R. NEHEMAKS, JR.t "Well, sir, have you come to settle?" "Yes, I have, sir, . . . the debt's two pound ten and the costs three pounds five, and here it is, sir." -TAo Pic wickT Papers I THE unprecedented release of consumption credit to masses of wage earners during the years 1920-1929, and the drastic changes in consumption habits resulting from the selling campaigns which were fought over a nationwide front,' have not been without effect upon the courts. How successfully the courts have been able to withstand the impact of the changed consumption system, and their ability to adjust a judicial procedure designed for an earlier and less complex economy, may be examined from a study of a specialized debt collection court. The -Boston Poor Debtor Court readily lends itself to such analysis. Its experience has extended from the colonial court which imprisoned for the non-payment of debt to the modern supplementary process court devoted almost exclusively to the collection of consumption credit judgments.
The statute under which the Poor Debtor Court functions was adopted in 1927,2 and embodies substantially the equitable process or Dubuque Law, as it is parochially known, for the collection of a judgment, which had been employed exclusively in judgments for -Second year student in the Yale School of Law. This study is an adjunct of the bankruptcy project sponsored by the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University and the Yale Law School. The writer wishes to acknowledge his deep indebtedness to Professor W. 0. Douglas in whose seminar at the Yale Law School this study was first suggested. Thanks are due William J. Donovan, Clerk of the Boston Municipal Court for Civil Business, and Assistant Clerks Devine, Blakeman and Tobin for their valuable assistance. [5611 necessaries and labor performed. 3 Under the Dubuque Law authority was placed in the court to order payments by instalments, to modify payments, or revoke the order. U1pon failure to comply with a court order, the debtor was to be adjudged in contempt and might be committed to prison. The "equitable process" law was intended not only as a measure of protection to the small shop-keeper, who had provided the necessaries of life and to the laboring man who had performed services, but equally to the "poor people for whom these services had been performed, and who, from unfortunate circumstances might be reduced to utter destitution, however honest they might be unless there was some protection provided in the form of a court order for gradual payments, and a prohibition of attachment of wages pending the proceedings." 4
By the terms of the 1927 Act a judgment creditor may file in court an application for supplementary process, causing a summons to issue requiring the judgment debtor to appear for an "examination relative to his property and ability to pay." 5 If the court finds that the debtor has no property and is unable to pay the judgment, the proceedings may be dismissed. 0 If, however, the examination discloses that the debtor is in possession of property not exempt from 3. AcTs (1898) c. 549.
4. JUDICATURE COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46. The report of the Municipal Court to the City of Boston criticized the "equitable process" law as follows: "It seems a fair comment that what was originally intended to be a simple procedure, devoid of technicality, has in practice become highly technical and a trap for the unwary. The chief causative factor is legislation in extreme detail, reducing to the point of extinction the rule-making power of the court, which might be otherwise used for relief from hard conditions. . . . An attempt on the part of a genuinely poor debtor to secure relief through the poor debtor's oath without the assistance of counsel is a :perilous adventure. The attention of the creditor is focused quite as much -upon the opportunity to catch his adversary napping, and thereby transfer the -debt to the shoulders of a friendly surety, as upon any real examination in the debtor's finances. The main objective is possession of the debtor's person upon the execution." REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAI COURT TO THE CITY OF BOSTON, DOC, Law, The Johns Hopkins University. Here the Clerk of Court serves as trustee and distributes the money paid into court on a pro-rata basis to the various creditors having claims for necessaries against the debtor at the time of the application. No proceedings in attachment, aid of execution or otherwise, to subject the personal earnings of the debtor to the payment of claims for necessaries may be brought so long as "at least twenty per centum of the personal earnings of such debtor is paid to the trustee at regular intervals, as fixed by the court. . . " Thirteen Ohio cities-Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo, Conneaut, East Liverpool, Fosteria, Lorain, Massillon, Newark, Piqua, Springfield, Steubenville, and Zenia-have in operation substantially the debtor's trustee process which has been described. The main variation in the provisions in the acts where the trustee procedure is in operation is the minimum percentage of the debtor's personal earnings -which is to be paid into court. The most frequent provision is that the percentage shall be fifteen. Other of the municipal acts provide for the minimum payment of twenty per cent, and the Conneaut act provides for the payment of not more than fifty per cent of such personal earnings, leaving the precise per cent to be determined by the court. Amortization of wage-earner debts is also made possible through the small claims statutes. 10. § 16. But a sentence for contempt does not end the proceedings nor any order made therein, the Court retaining jurisdiction until an order is entered expressly dismissing the proceedings.
§ 16.
from any judgment, order or sentence entered by the court.12 In the words of Chief Justice Rugg, the Act was designed, "to provide a searching inquiry into the ability of the judgment debtor to pay his legal obligation, to relieve him from harassment if found unable to pay, but to compel him to do what an honest man ought to be willing to do if found able to pay in whole or in part." 13
The Poor Debtor Court is an integral part of the Boston Municipal Court and is presided over by the same judges who regularly sit in the Municipal Court sessions. Including the Chief Justice, nine municipal court judges may be assigned to preside over poor debtor sessions for a fixed period during the course of the year. With the exception of the summer months, court begins at eleven o'clock and continues until one or one thirty o'clock or later depending upon the volume of cases'. One hundred and fifty to two hundred cases on an average are called daily. 1 4 The court procedure follows a definite routine: before any oral examinations are heard the clerk announces that the court will hear any arrangements for payments which the parties have agreed upon outside of court. The debtor having been sworn, the agreement is usually allowed by the court perfunctorily. Frequently an agreement entered into by the parties is approved by the court although the debtor has no possibility of meeting the stipulated payments. In many instances, the debtor has consented to the agreement only to rid himself of the pressure which the creditor may have brought to bear upon him. In such cases defaults, continuances, contempt citations inevitably result, and the whole collection apparatus of the court must be brought into operation to collect an instalment that should not have been The next step in the court room procedure is the calling of the docket list of cases scheduled for the day. The clerk may report that the creditor's attorney is engaged in another court and request that the court hold the case over for the end of the session. The practice lends itself to abuse. Thus, an engagement slip will be filed by an attorney who seeks to avoid appearing before a particular judge whom he believes to be lenient toward debtors. The device is sometimes used as a means of "wearing the debtor out." Thus, a workingman summoned to appear in the Poor Debtor Court has not only lost several hours pay, and been caused the embarrassment, perhaps, of explaining his forced absence from the job to his employer, but on arriving in court is informed that the creditor's attorney is engaged in another court. Either because he is unaware that he is expected to remain in the courtroom until his case is again called by the clerk or thoroughly annoyed with all that has happened, he leaves the courtroom. Since he is now in contempt of court, a capias will be issued for his arrest. 1 5 This procedure may continue from time to time. And the debtor will, of course, be compelled to pay for the cost of his own arrests in his final settlement with the creditor. On the first calling of the docket-list, both creditor and debtor may have failed to appear and the clerk will announce the proceedings dismissed; or the creditor alone may have failed to appear, and thereby caused the proceedings to be dismissed. Should the creditor be present and the debtor in default, the clerk will issue a capias for his arrest. It may be that the creditor has not been able to secure the service of a summons or capias on the debtor and he will now petition the court for the issuance of a second or a third citation as the situation may be. At this time the creditor through his attorney may announce that he desires to dismiss proceedings, having reached a settlement -with the debtor; or persuaded by the futility of attempting to collect anything on his judgment, the creditor may have decided to abandon the case and request a dismissal. A petition for a notice to show cause as to why the debtor should not be adjudged in contempt of court for failure to obey an order to pay may be filed with the court; a notice to show cause having been issued and the debtor having failed to appear, the creditor may ask for a capias for his arrest; or, having settled with the debtor after the issuance of the "notice to show cause", the creditor may ask that the proceedings be dismissed; or, 
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YALE LAW JOURNAL again, the clerk may announce that the proceedings are being held open since the creditor has not returned the notice to show cause to the clerk's office. For failure to return a capias or summons on its due date, the clerk will announce at this time the dismissal of the proceedings. On the debtor's name being called, the clerk may inform the court of his petition in bankruptcy and the creditor will ask that the case be continued four or eight months to await the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings. Having thus disposed of the procedural minutiae, the clerk will call for the examination of debtors. The purpose of the examination as has been seen is to give the creditor an opportunity to ascertain whether the debtor possesses property 11 or is able to pay off his judgment by instalment or deferred payments. At the examination, additional evidence may be introduced to show the changed circumstances in the debtor's financial condition for the purpose of demonstrating that the debtor has (a) wilfully neglected to pay a previous order and should be punished for contempt, or (b) that the debtor's altered circumstances necessitate a further continuance of the proceedings, or an outright dismissal. In the case of the inarticulate debtor or one speaking a foreign tongue, unless represented by counsel, 17 the possibilities of successfully explaining "altered circumstances" to a court (which has, perhaps, just announced on the debtor's taking the stand that upon him "lies the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court") are remote. To illustrate from a case history (17160): On May 11, 1928, the debtor was summoned to appear before the court for an examination relative to his property and ability to pay. He defaulted and thereafter a capias was issued for his arrest; on July .6, 1928, the debtor appeared in court in the custody of a constable and was ordered to pay $2.00 weekly on account of his judgment for $50.16. Shortly afterwards, the creditor reported to the court that'the debtor had defaulted in his payments and petitioned the court for a notice to show cause why the debtor should not be adjudged in contempt for failing to make the payments as ordered by the court. This same process of default and arrest continued until June 22, 1932 when the debtor was again examined. By this time interest on the judgment amounted to $14.85; the costs on 16. See note 5, supra. 17. In 1931, debtors were represented by counsel in 77 cases; in 1932, in 79 cases. A debtor who is represented by counsel is apt to create an unfavorablo impression on the court. For, obviously, if the debtor is able to engage counsol, the question of why he is unable to pay his judgment is uppermost in the thought of the particular judge. For this reason debtors are frequently advised by counsel without actually being represented at the examination.
[Vol. 42 the various services was $33.00-a total cost to the debtor of $47.85, almost the amount of the original judgment. Since the judgment had been entered against the debtor four years prior, there had been several additions to his family; his wife had been to the hospital for several operations. In addition to being under court orders in the Boston Poor Debtor Court, the debtor was under orders on a judgment in one of the suburban courts. Two attachments on his $35 weekly wage hd been made within a year. His rent was $380 in arrears. Altogether over the four year period the debtor had made some seventeen payments to the creditor. None of the foregoing evidence was introduced into court by the debtor due to his fright. Undoubtedly, had the debtor been represented by counsel his "altered circumstances" would have been presented to the court's attention. ' Had the debtor been more articulate or the court surroundings less formidable, any one of the foregoing events might well have served as an adequate defence. As it was, the case was dragged through four years; relief was denied a harassed debtor; the costs practically equalled the value of the judgment; and when the debtor finally sought the advice of counsel, the creditor lost any further opportunity for receiving payments, since the debtor was advised to file a petition in bankruptcy.
The oral examination of the debtor by the creditor's attorney tends to consume more time than is warranted by the results: too often the creditor launches forth on a wish fulfillment expedition in the hope of finding property which there is clearly no possibility of discovering. This preoccupation by creditors with the finding of property of the debtor had been the cause to a large extent of the criticism of the 1898 Poor Debtor Law.' Examination of debtors by creditors had become under the old Dubuque Law something in the nature of an organized contest played under court rules. Counsel exerted every effort to trace some property into the debtor's ownership. The debtor countered by attempting to explain away the supposed ownership. A successful outcome depended on preventing the debtor from explaining what he had done with property he had never owned. -The examination of debtors under the present poor debtor law is not altogether free of the evils of the earlier law. The initiative in conducting the examination might well be left with the court, with counsel merely guiding the court by the presentation of evidence. 2 0 In the writer's opinion, wherever he has seen the bench conduct the examination, results satisfactory to both the 18. But cf. note 17, supra.
19. See note 4, supra. 
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YALE LAW JOURNAL creditor and the debtor have invariably followed, with a saving of time to all parties. With the court taking the initiative in conducting the examinations, the debtor is apt to feel that the court Is befriending him, and will generally answer questions tTuthfully and directly. On the other hand, with creditor's counsel conducting the examination, the debtor feels a natural antagonism, is constantly on the defensive and too often advisedly evasive.
II
Having seen the Poor Debtor Court as its judicial machinery functions on a typical court day-the issuing of the capias', the citations for contempt, the dangers that lie in wake for the debtor unfamiliar with the intricacies of the courtroom, the motions and petitions, the examination of the debtor by the creditor's attorney-it becomes important to subject the court and its procedural operation to a more particularized analysis for an answer to the following questions: What kind of persons are dealt with by the Court? Who are the creditors? How large are the debts? How effective is the Court's procedural machinery in serving the creditor; in affording relief to the hard-pressed debtor? The following analysis of the Poor Debtor Court is based on a study of 4866 terminated cases on the court docket from January, 1931, through September 15, 1932. These cases involved a total judgment-indebtedness of $1,268,962.48 -an average of $260.78 per case. In both years the largest class of judgment creditors was retailers (2708 cases, or about 56% of the total cases studied), with a total indebtedness of $435,575.54. During both years individuals who had loaned money to the debtor were the second largest creditor group employing the Poor Debtor Court, the total indebtedness to this group of creditors being $398,283.13 in 471 or about 10% of the total cases. Third in size of creditor indebtedness are debts due landlords amounting to $99,802.47 in 421, or about 9% of the total cases. Miscellaneous and No Entry 21 items occupy the next largest groupings with $58,919.31 indebtedness in 408 or 8% of the cases and $175,090.20 in 329 cases or 7% of the cases respectively; loan companies and credit unions constitute the next group of judgment creditors with judgments amounting respectively to $42,872.57 in 266 or 6% of the total cases and $53,051.37 in 227 or 5% of the cases. Unlicensed loan companies constituted the smallest number of cases with a total judgment indebtedness of $10,387.89 in 29 cases or 6% 21. The "No Entry" category includes those cases in which it was impossiblo to ascertain the creditor's business or the nature of the debt either from the Poor Debtor Court records or the judgment papers on file in the Municipal Court.
[Vol. 42 of the total cases. 22 The largest number of these cases, as has been indicated, were retail items. There is no way, however, of determining accurately the exact number of cases which were the result of an extension of instalment credit. An unpublished study made by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston of six Boston department stores indicates that from 1927 to 1930 the annual cash sales of the six stores which were studied have on the whole decreased; regular charge sales have increased slightly; but instalment sales have on the whole steadily increased.
2 3 Data are not available for establishing a correlation between the rise of instalment sales during these years and the influx of retail cases in the Poor Debtor Court. But of the total number of retail cases studied, eighteen department stores, employing the court with the greatest frequency, contributed only 382 cases or 10% of the retail cases for the year 1931. The smallest number of cases entered by a single department store was 1, and the largest number was 83. During 1932 (up to and including September 15) 13 department stores contributed a total of 62 poor debtor entries or about 5% of the total retail cases. The volume of cases entered by a single store ranged from 1 to 24.2-An analysis of the range and distribution of the individual debts over the two year period studied reveals that the court largely handles small claims. 2 5 Thus, in 1074 cases the debt is under $50.00. In 1056 cases the debt ranges from $50 to $99.99. In 652 cases the debt ranges from $100 to $149.99; and in 435 cases from $150 to $199.99. In 726 cases the debt was from $200 to $399.99. But at least 90% of the cases as may be seen from Table I involved debts under $700. Since the court is one of unlimited jurisdiction, debts ranging from $7,000 to $144,528.34 are not unknown. These judgment debts, however, are all debts owed by a single debtor to a single creditor. The Boston Poor Debtor Court has no arrangement for distributing debts on a pro rata basis to the several creditors. How many of the judgment debtors owed debts to creditors other than those who filed application for supplementary proceedings is not accurately known. That many debtors do owe more than one creditor is evidenced by the frequent number of supplementary process entries entered against the same debtor. Thus, case 38870 in 1931 owed 10 judgment creditors all of whom had begun supplementary proceedings. The same debtor was also a judgment debtor in 1932 (case 42833). In case 42067 the judgment debtor owed debts to four judgment creditors. From the point of view of the creditor the present method of proceeding individually against a debtor is costly and time consuming as will be shown later. Whether a system of prorating debts to creditors could avoid the 
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difficulties of the present procedure cannot be finally determined. The problem, nevertheless, is one to be considered in any appraisal of a supplementary process court.
II
1.
The creditor's fortunes for better or worse depend at the very outset upon being able to serve successfully the debtor with a summons to appear in court on a specified date for an examination relative to his property and ability to pay. From seven to ten days elapse from the time application for supplementaryz process is entered until the citation for the debtor is ready to be served. The summons is usually served by a constable. 2 0 (Most of the law firms specializing in Poor Debtor cases employ their own constable for this work.) The cost to the creditor of serving this initial process upon the debtor-eventually charged to the debtor-is $3.00 for the entry of the petition for supplementary process; $.50 for a copy which is served on the debtor; $.10 per mile travelled in making the service; and $1.00 for making the service.
2T
The summons may be served "at the last and usual abode" of the debtor, or by its delivery to the debtor in person. 2 8 The summons must be served at least seven days before the return day on which the summons is due in court. If due service is not made, the court may order further notice. 2 9 Of the 4454 cases in the period studied, in which summons issued, in 2839 cases the debtor did not appear in court in answer to the summons. This may have been due to three factors: either a service was not made on the debtor, or the service having been made, the debtor immediately settled with the creditor; or after having been served, the debtor defaulted. In 1931 there were only 293 cases reported in which no service was made on the debtor; and in 1932, 107, a total of 400 cases for the entire period. Of the 2829 cases in which the debtor did not appear in answer to the summons, an indeterminate number are to be accounted for as having been settled, and that, therefore, the creditor did not trouble himself to return the summons to court. In 3283 cases one summons was issued by the court; in 613 cases, two summonses were issued; in 414 cases, three summonses; in 131 cases, four summonses; and five summonses were issued in 13 cases. 
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YALE LAW JOURNAL of the cases the creditor required from two to five summonses before service-if then-could be made on the debtor.
2.
Under the terms of the statute, the court is empowered to issue a capias for the arrest, and to employ other processes for securing the attendance of debtors or creditors to answer for any contempt arising under the supplementary proceedings.
0 Where a creditor petitions the court for a capias for the arrest of a debtor who has failed to appear in answer to the court summons, a "service in hand" rather than the "last and usual abode" will almost always be required by the court before granting the capias. To fulfill the requirement of a "service in hand" the constable may state that the capias was left with the debtor's wife or an adult member of the debtor's family. If, however, the service was made at the debtor's "last and usual abode" the constable is required to state that the creditor's attorney was duly notified of the manner in which the service was made. In short, the court will not issue a capias unless it can be shown unequivocally that the debtor received notice to appear in court. Nor will the court authorize an arrest to be made after sunset. The cost of issuing and serving a capias is $1.00 for the service of the capias on the debtor; $4.00 for each day the debtor remains in the custody of a constable, the constable remaining in attendance on the debtor until expressly excused by the court; 81 and $2.00 for an assistant to subdue the rough and bellicose debtor (an assistant is always required).32 After the debtor has been arrested, the constable will at once bring him into court. The clerk will then take the debtor before the court, if it is in session, or to the chambers of the Municipal Court. The question of the debtor's contempt is then heard. The debtor must explain why he did not appear in answer to the court summons. If the debtor is able to explain his default satisfactorily, he may be purged of his contempt, and a date fixed for the further hearing of the case; or the question of contempt may be held open pending the next hearing. If the creditor's attorney is present a hearing may be held forthwith and a disposition made of the case.
During 1931-1932, of the terminated cases studied there were 17 cases of commitments to jail for contempt of court. But the number of commitments in cases still running on the court docket is much larger. The number of days for which debtors were sen- [Vol. 42
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tenced totaled 130, the largest single sentence being 10 days and the smallest 5 days. The total number of days actually served in jail was 37. In 10 cases the release from jail was secured by the debtor's making a settlement with the creditor; in 4 cases the order was revoked; in 1 case the release was secured through a writ of habeas corpus, the debtor having filed a petition in bankruptcy. But a debtor sentenced to jail for contempt from the Poor Debtor Court, and who subsequently files a petition in bankruptcy, can no longer be released from his jail sentence by a writ of habeas corpus.
33
Case number 23541 brings into high relief the use by the creditors as pressure devices of the capias and imprisonment for contempt of court. On January 10, 1929 application for supplementary process was filed against the debtor on a judgment for $180.15. On March 7th the debtor was orally examined and ordered by the court to pay $5.00 weekly. After two months had elapsed the debtor defaulted in his payments and a notice to show cause as to why he should not be adjudged in contempt was issued. Having failed to answer the notice, a capias was issued for the debtor's arrest. Shortly thereafter the debtor appeared in court in the custody of a constable and was purged of contempt and the proceedings continued over to August 7th when the debtor was again examined and found to have property which was ordered assigned to the creditor and the case held over for compliance with the order. On October 17 the order for the assignment of the debtor's property was revoked and the debtor was now ordered to pay $40.00 forthwith, and $10.00 by October 21st. The debtor again defaulted in making payment to the creditor and after being arrested and purged of contempt was ordered to pay $25 weekly out of his income. This was on March 4, 1930. On March 28, 1930, having been found guilty of contempt the debtor was sentenced to 5 days in jail. This same process of continuing the case, the subsequent default in payments by the debtor, his arrest and sentence to jail, has continued periodically. Altogether the debtor has been sentenced to 75 days in jail, 9 capias' have been issued for the debtor's arrest. A total of 45 continuances from January 10, 1929, when application for supplementary process was entered, to February 6, 1933, when the case was again heard, involving costs to the creditor for bringing the debtor into court and back to jail of $124.70 (which the debtor will eventually have to pay). Here, obviously, the creditor is deliberately attempting to "wear the debtor out". By requesting the court to continue the proceedings, an opportunity is prepared for the debtor's default. 
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The cost of the various capias' and constable fees enlarge the costs which the debtor must eventually pay. Moreover, here the capias is being used as a "collection club". It is against this use of the capias-the most effective weapon against the debtor which the creditor possesses-as a collection club that the court must particularly guard if injustice is to be avoided. Yet in the case cited, the Poor Debtor Court (which probably included all of the Municipal Court judges) has allowed the case to run for four years, issued 9 capias', imprisoned the debtor for a total of 75 days, and allowed costs to mount to over half of the original judgment.
Viewing the Poor Debtor cases as a whole over the years 1931-1932, a capias for the debtor's arrest for being in contempt of court was issued in 1831 cases. In 869 cases, or about 50o of these cases, one capias was issued; in 351 cases, or 187, two capias' were issued; and in 400 cases, or 21%, three capias' were issued. While most judges will not allow a creditor more than three successive capias' for the arrest of any one debtor, there were, nevertheless, 192 cases in which 4 capias' had been granted, and 13 cases in which 5 capias' had been allowed. And in 1932 there were six recorded cases in which 6 capias' had been allowed. The capias may be used by the creditor over a period of from five to six weeks. A second capias, when requested, will customarily be allowed by the court as a matter of course. But a request for a third capias will usually require a "good and substantial" reason from the creditor, e.g., that the debtor has just inherited some money; that the debtor after having been out of work is now re-employed and the creditor is able to make service on him; or that the creditor has discovered some property, which the debtor is attempting to hide. A capias returned unused will automatically cause the proceedings to be dismissed. The comparative ease with which the capias is procured accounts, to some extent, for the frequency of its use. A common practice among lawyers, who specialize in Poor Debtor cases, is to secure a capias for a debtor's arrest, and then not use it. Instead of engaging a constable to serve the capias on the debtor, the lawyers who make a practice of this device proceed to write the debtor a dunning letter to the effect that a capias for the debtor's arrest has been procured but the debtor will not be arrested providing a settlement is immediately made at the lawyer's office. Fear of arrest may cause the debtor to make a small payment, or else the letter is ignored and the debtor not heard from. At the expiration date of the capias, a second capias is procured and the same procedure is again followed.
It is to be noted, however, that of the 1831 cases in which a capias was issued, 160 cases, or 3.27, were settled immediately after the [Vol. 42 debtor's arrest, and in 395 cases or 87, the capias was returned to court, no service having been made on the debtor.
The history of the writ is no less strange than the institution of which it is a part. Emerging trom a social order -which recognized that since credit could only be given to a man with goods, it vas just and fair that his goods should be seized if he failed to carry out his contract, the writ of capias ad satisfaciendumn (the "ca. sa." as it was written in the legal shorthand) was gradually extended by custom and statute 34 so that by the eighteenth century it had become "the bane of Mr. Micawber's e~'dstence, imprisonment for debt on mesne process". 35 Imprisonment for debt made its appear-34. The attachment of the person, the "body warrant" or latter-day capias was unknown to the common law, since it would seem that originally the common law admitted of executions only against the property of a debtor. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert explains it thus: "There was no capias for the Debt or Damages of a Common Person, because the party having trusted him with personal Things his remedy was only in the Personal Estate, and the King had the Interest in the Body of his subject; and the Lord in his Feudatory or Vassal to be called out to War or to labour for him; and therefore none but the King could imprison him." THE LAW OF EXECUTIONs (1763) 58 
37.
Thus, when the celebrated Body of Liberties made its appearance in 1641, the General Court was able to decree, "That no man's person shall be kept in prison for debt, but where there is an appearance of some estate which he will not produce." And while the debtor might satisfy his debt by service "if the Creditor require it," the magistrates were solicitous that he not be sold to "any but of the English Nation." THE GENEiiAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF THE MAS "Even the significant word 'abolished', when taken as it must be, in connection with the other detailed provisions of the act, is found to mean only that imprisonment for debt, from the time it went into operation, should be modified, and mitigated in conformity with these provisions.
Writs and executions are stil to issue in the usual form, coinmanding the proper officers, for want of property found, to arrest the bodies of debtors."
The overtones of imprisonment for debt continued to reverberate in the Massachusetts courts long after Chief Justice Shaw's opinion. 4 And in contemporary Boston, far removed from the debtor's prisons of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century, the note of imprisonment for debt is again echoed. For the constitutionality of the Poor Debtor statute, which empowers the court to order a debtor to pay off a judgment on the basis of his future earning capacity, has been challenged as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. In McDermott v. Bryer 4 5 plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the federal district court from the consequences of an order issued by the Poor Debtor Court. It was plaintiff's argument that the court order to pay $200 monthly out of future earnings and the implicit punishment for contempt should the plaintiff default, was in violation of the provision of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting involuntary servitude. But the federal court was not impressed with plaintiff's REPORTs (1837) 574, in which was enunciated the principle that debt should never be treated as a crime, and still less as a crime to be punished at the sole will and pleasure of the creditor. Imprisonment for debt in England was abolished fourteen years after the Massachusetts Act by the Debtor's Act, 1869. Cf., however, PARRY contention, and held that the order of the Poor Debtor Court was not "coercing the plaintiff to a condition of peonage." 40 So a debtor is no longer imprisoned for not paying his debts. But he may be imprisoned for being in contempt of court for failure to obey an order relating to the payment of his debts. Should a debtor fail to answer the court summons he is liable to arrest by a constable. If the debtor appears before a judge who believes that all debtors are shiftless folk lacking in thrift, or should the court be unsatisfied with the inarticulate attempts at explanation of the debtor's altered circumstances, the probability of a sojourn in the Charles Street jail becomes imminent. Steady pressure from the creditor with the capias handy as a collection club; the possibility of being sentenced to jail or fined for being in contempt of court; the stigma of proceedings in the Poor Debtor Court; at the opposite polarity the escape through bankruptcy-if one has sufficient money for the entry fees-are considerations which loom large in the wage earner's mind.
3.
It was previously suggested that between the "screw-system" of forcing a payment out of the debtor by the threat of arrest, and the fear of imprisonment for contempt should the debtor default in his appearance or fail to satisfy the court "by a preponderance of evidence" of his inability to continue payments, bankruptcy was the one escape for the hard pressed debtor. Moreover, too frequent continuances of the proceedings by judges who are not sufficiently familiar with the case histories before them, the entry of an order to pay without adequate investigation of the debtor's ability to follow up payments, agreements for instalment payments made by the debtor with the creditor's attorney outside of court-in order to avoid the immediate pressure which is being brought to bear upon him, successfully ,aid the toll of bankruptcy. On the other hand, 46 . It was also contended that the order of the Poor Debtor Court violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that plaintiff was being deprived of his liberty and property without due process of law. But the federal district court was "not concerned with the wisdom or expediency of the legislation", nor was it able to "review findings of the State Court that the plaintiff has the ability to pay". And plaintiff's argument on the Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed because, as it was said, first, statutes prohibiting a review of findings of fact are not incompatible with due process of law, and, second, the "right of appeal is not essential to due process of law." On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals (No. 2740 C. C. A. 1st, 1932) plaintiff was equally unsuccessful. For it was there held that a federal court was without jurisdiction to "enjoin a supplementary proceeding in whole or in part in a state court in aid of a valid judgment entered in that court to enforce the collection of payment of the judgment."
[Vol. 42 bankruptcy serves as the escape par excellence for the fraudulent debtor who desires to throw the creditor off his trail by announcing in the Poor Debtor court that he has filed a petition in bankruptcy. By placing a certificate of adjudication with the clerk of the Poor Debtor Court, the "sophisticated judgment debtor" may easily escape from his judgment, even though he later fails to make application for a discharge, since the average creditor feels that when the bankruptcy stage has been reached, the possibilities of collection are slight.
Whatever was the determinative motivation for bankruptcy. there were during the period of study 146 bankruptcy cases coming from the Poor Debtor Court. In half of the cases (73) the mere entry of supplementary proceedings was sufficient to induce the debtor to file a petition in bankruptcy. And in 46 cases a petition was filed directly following the first hearing in Poor Debtor Court; in 10 cases the petition was filed immediately after an order to pay by instalment payments had been ordered. In short, the mere entry of supplementary process, without any attempt at liquidating the debt, induced about 50% of the bankruptcies; the remainder of the bankruptcies would seem to have been induced by the extended operation of the court procedural machinery, that is, either too frequent continuances or the entry of an order to pay.
7
The total indebtedness of the 146 bankruptcy cases was $102, 458.64. The average debt of each individual in 1931 was $706.69 and in 1932, $704.36. In 77 cases the liability was to retail creditors. In 20 cases the debt was owed landlords; individuals were creditors in 21 cases, and credit unions in 5 cases. Licensed loan companies had 7 claims and the no entry group 10 claims. Liabilities charged to miscellaneous claims accounted for 6 cases.
The average number of continuances per case in which there was a continuance in 1931 was 2.1, and in 1932, 3. Continuances, which might have been prevented, would seem to be the cause of 7 bankruptcies in 1932 (where an order to pay had been entered). Discharges were granted in 76 cases (52c) and denied in 33 cases (22.7%) because either the fees had not been paid or the debtor had failed to make an application for a discharge. There were 27 cases (18.4%) pending, awaiting trustees' accounts or referees' reports. And in 10 cases (6.8%) no entry is recorded as to the disposition of the case. 
4.
An analysis of the case dismissals further discloses the failure of the Poor Debtor Court as an instrumentality for the effective collection of judgment debts. Once more the statistical data reveal the stresses and strains of an antiquated judicial machinery laboring under the impact of administrative and procedural problems with which it was not designed to cope.
The analysis of dismissals is based on 4224 cases of the 4866 cases studied. This number does not include all of the cases dismissed during the period studied. Only the largest groups were included and those cases where the information as to the reason for the dismissal was complete. The total of 4224 cases is, therefore, indicative of tendencies and practices. It will be seen from Table II that in 795 cases (16.3%), the dismissal was due to inabiity of the creditor to make a service on the debtor. Of this class of dismissals, it will be further noted that capias process was ineffectual in reaching the debtor in 395 cases or 8.1%. Inability to reach the debtor by the initial summons accounted for 400 cases or 7.6%o. In 1068 cases (21.9%o) the dismissal was due to the creditor's failure to return either the capias or summons on the due date. The large number of cases so disposed may be accounted for by the following factors: (a) negligence on the part of the constable in returning the summons or capias to the clerk's office on time; (b) no service on the debtor was actually made and the creditor did not trouble himself further with the case; (c) the creditor succeeded in making a settlement with the debtor, and, therefore, found it unnecessary to return the process to the clerk's office. 48 In 289 cases (5.7%) the dismissal was requested by oral 48. But the number of cases under this category would not seem to be overlarge for in 1831 cases in which a capias had been issued by the court only 3.2% were settled following the debtor's arrest.
[Vol. 42 motion of creditor. There is no accurate way of estimating the number of cases dismissed under this category as a result of a settlement between creditor and debtor. In 547 cases (11.25) dismissals were due to the failure of appearance of either the creditor or both the creditor and debtor. Here again allowance must be made, in appraising the failure of appearance by the parties, for a percentage of cases in which a settlement was reached outside court. In 292 cases the precise reason for a dismissal is not recorded on the docket. Over 10% of the cases (511) were dismissed because upon examination it was disclosed that the debtor had neither property nor ability to pay off the judgment by partial payments. In 110 cases (2.2%) a dismissal was granted because it was found that the co-signer of a note was able to pay. Practically all of these cases were on loans due the Boston Morris Plan Company.
49
Actual settlements were reported in 548 cases (11.2) : 401 cases (8.2%) were dismissed on motion of creditor; 77 cases (1.55) were dismissed by the court, the debtor having complied with the court order; 30 cases (.6%) were dismissed by the court because the parties had apparently reached a settlement; and 40 cases (.8%) on oral motion of the debtor who had previously settled. 49. The co-maker is always made a defendant in the supplementary proceedings, and must appear in court with the maker. Should the co-maker fail to appear in answer to the initial summons, he is in contempt of court and a capias will issue for his arrest.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Under subdivision 3 of Table III "partial loss to creditor", it may be supposed that about 20% of the cases were settled and that the creditor (a) did not care to return the process to the clerk's office, or (b) appear in court. If, then, these 452 cases are totalled with the 548 cases actually reported settled, it would mean that the creditor was successful in approximately 1000 cases or about 22% of the 4454 cases in which a summons was issued following the application for supplementary process; and in 110 additional cases the creditor might sustain the hope. of receiving payments.
5.
It has been seen from the previous discussion, that the whole procedural machinery of the statute is directed toward bringing the debtor into court in order that he may be examined "relative to his property and ability to pay." Where a debtor's principal asset is not tangible lands or chattels, but earning power, the fruitful aspect of such an examination is not detection of property but an inquiry into ability to pay out of the returns of future earnings. The traditional supplementary process procedure is aimed at the detection of tangible property. It is with this procedure that the Boston Poor Debtor Court is best acquainted. With the expansion of consumption credit coupled with the growth of the wage system such procedure becomes of secondary importance. The available court procedure for subjecting future income to payment of debts is either an order to pay by a stipulated date or an order for instalment payments until the debt is finally liquidated. A fairly reliable index of a court's competency in enforcing the collection of consumption debts may, therefore, be found in the extent and frequency of its use of such orders. And besides the indicium which such orders afford of the court's success as an effective collection instrumentality, they may well indicate that the court is not unaware of the debtor's economic circumstances. But if the frequency of orders to pay at a deferred date or by instalments is to be used as indicative of the court's effectiveness in the collection of debts, the Boston Poor Debtor Court presents a poor record. For in only 111 of the 4866 terminated cases studied were such orders entered.
The infrequency of orders to pay however, raises serious questions as to whether the problem of budgeting future income can be adequately accomplished by the cumbersome process of hearings in open court accompanied by a formal procedure; and if the peculiar debt funding problems of the Poor Debtor Court are properly the function of a judicial body at all. Again, it is a question of whether it is not idle and mistaken to thrust what is properly an adminis- trative burden on an already overworked municipal court unprovided with the necessary auxiliary administrative machinery.
Of the 111 cases in which the Court ordered liquidation of the debt by instalment and deferred payments, by far the largest number (62) during both years were ordered to be paid through instalment payments on a weekly basis; 23 cases on a monthly basis; and 26 miscellaneously, e.g., an immediate payment to be followed by a subsequent payment thereby completely liquidating the debt, or the assignment of some property accompanied by one or more monetary payments. For 1931, the average weekly amount 6rdered paid to the creditor was $4.17. For 1932, the weekly average was somewhat lower, $3.00 per week. The monthly average for instalment payments in 1931 was $6.44 as compared with the monthly average for 1932 of $9.61. Of the 55 cases where an order to pay had been entered in 1931, defaults in payments occurred in 70% of the cases. That is to say, default occurred in 39 out of the 55 cases. In some of these, more than one default was entered, the average being 1.4. Of the 56 cases where an order to pay had been entered for 1932, there were defaults in 50 cases with 1 default as an average for each case. In 38 cases in 1931 the debtor was cited for contempt of court for failure to obey the court order for instalment payments; and in 1932, 28 debtors were similarly cited for contempt. An increase in the original order was made in 1931 in 1 case, but in no cases during 1932. During 1931 reductions or revisions on the original order to pay were made in 10 cases. In 1932, the original orders in 36 cases were revised or reduced, and of these 36 cases, 20 revisions were due to the debtor's utter inability to continue further payments. The proceedings in these 20 cases were dismissed, under the court's statutory power, due to the debtor's being without property or present ability to pay.r 0
In the 111 cases constituting the group which received an order to pay by instalment and deferred payments, a settlement with the creditor was reported in 66 cases. Since payments are made by the debtor directly to the creditor or his attorney, there is no way of determining whether these 66 cases reported "settled" by the creditor were fully or only partially liquidated. In 1931 of the 55 cases where an order to pay had been entered an average of 144.8 days was required for the termination of each case; in 1932 the average number of days for the termination of the 56 instalment payment cases increased to 257.9 days. Of the 1931 cases, 6 cases filed petitions in bankruptcy; in 3 cases the bankruptcy petition followed after the court order to pay had been entered. Of the 1932 cases,
§ 16.
1933]
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It is not to be inferred that the above 111 cases completely or accurately describe the poor debtor cases in which liquidation through instalment and deferred payments has occurred. There were also, as will be seen from Table II , some 548 settled cases in which instalment payments were made by the debtor to the creditor without a specific court order. Nor is it accurately known whether the method of instalment payments made to the creditor from time to time results in a complete or only partial liquidation. But the crosssection of 111 cases where the court definitely entered an order to pay does afford an opportunity to appraise the existing method, and evaluate the difficulties of collection which, perhaps, would confront any other similar method, and suggest possibilities for improvement.
At the very outset, it is apparent that overworked municipal court justices, who preside over the Poor Debtor sessions, are unable to devote the painstaking care necessary to a fully adequate disposition of the immediate case before them. In the first place, the Poor Debtor Court does not present the most exciting of the judicial work. Most of the judges regard their periodic appointments to the Poor Debtor sessions as an unpleasant chore and in the nature of a necessary judicial evil. Consequently, there is a tendency to rush through with the docket in the shortest possible time. Since no one judge sits for more than a few weeks at a time, it is possible for a debtor to appear before several judges, none of whom is familiar with the debtor's background or case-history. 1 1 It is apparent that the frequency of continuances, coupled with the rotation of judges is a serious obstacle to effective administration of the cases. In some cases still running on the court docket, the number of continuances granted exceeds the maximum given above. Cases are sometimes continued for months and even years.
[Vol. 42 case records are recorded in a fashion so little short of primitive that an attempt on the part of the judge hastily to familiarize him-eif with the case history at the debtor's examination becomes exceedingly difficult. 5 2 Frequently, a judge is confronted with a case in which an order has been entered by a colleague. The debtor may present a story as to his conditions wholly different from that told at the previous hearing. The creditor's attorney denies its veracity. The court is confronted with 200 additional cases awaiting disposition. There is neither time nor an established technique for investigating the changed circumstances in the debtor's economic condition. To avoid patent injustice (not altogether unknown) the case is continued over for the judge who first heard it again to make a decision. The result may prove very unsatisfactory to the creditor in need of funds, and, perhaps, make for genuine hardship on the debtor who is usually in dire need of emancipation from debt. Furthermore, many of the judges presiding over Poor Debtor sessions have had to accept a task for which they are rU-prepared by training and disposition. They have brought to the Poor Debtor bench the procedural background of a rigid common law. Discretionary and extremely flexible as are the powers granted them by statute, an older discipline and daily experience with civil litigation, has sometimes prevented the application of the informality and flexibility of the chamber proceedings so essential to this mode of judicial determination. Under the existing method of procedure the burden of proof is upon the debtor to show why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court; or, perhaps, to explain to the satisfaction of the court why his present economic condition does not warrant the court making an order for payments. So often the judge hard pressed for time will disregard the inarticulate attempts at explanation. But those very explanations contain the seeds for understanding of the particular and immediate needs of the debtor. The result of attempting to apply 52. The court order or disposition of the case is recorded by the clerk on an ordinary lined index card. Only the bare disposition is recorded, e.g., that the debtor was ordered to pay and the amount, that the proceedings were continued over and the name of the judge who made the order. An attempt on the part of the court to decipher an immediate case history without the assistance of the clerk becomes a perilous adventure. The problem becomes especially acute on a particular day when the court docket is crowded and time is short. Obviously, there is need for a simplified, but at the same time systematic, case history of the debtor. This should contain not only an accurate recording of the disposition of the case, but relevant facts as to the debtor's dependents, income, outstanding salary attachments, wage assignments filed, number of creditors, amount of debt or debts, the number of continuances outstanding, and the confidential report on the debtor's altered circumstances prepared for the court by a trained field worker in the event the debtor pleads inability to continue further payments. See in this connection pp. 587-590, infra.
this antiquated judicial machinery for the collection of debts has led to a widespread dissatisfaction on the part of creditors, who, naturally begin to despair, after frequent continuances of their cases, of collecting anything on their judgment. The debtor, too, realizes little possibility of relief and must either continue to appear in court, trusting that he may convince the court of his inability to make further payments, stand the chance of imprisonment if he defaults and is found to be in contempt or else resort to bankruptcy as a way out of his debt. 53 Without exception the credit managers of the larger Boston department stores, and the reputable members of the bar who come before the court are uniformly critical of the effectualness of the court as a collection device. 5 4 And the Boston Legal Aid Society considers it little less than futile to advise a poor litigant to seek relief through the Poor Debtor Court. In its inability to marshal up the debtor's assets for a speedy liquidation the Poor Debtor Court fails as a collection device for the creditor; in its inability to investigate through a simple fact-finding technique the debtor's changing circumstances in order to grant relief when needed, and the lack of an administrative machinery for adequately budgeting a debtor's future income, the Poor Debtor Court fails as an agency for satisfying the individual as well as collective needs of an urbanized and shifting wage earner class.
IV
Conclusions
It is apparent from the analysis in the previous sections that as an instrumentality for the collection of consumption credit debts the Boston Poor Debtor Court is a failure. Moreover, it is questionable whether a collection device successful in only 227 of its cases warrants further support by the taxpayer. Under the present system it would seem that the only persons who prosper are the constables; for they at least receive their fixed stipends regardless of the fortunes of creditor or debtor. Nor is this the first occasion in the checkered career of the Poor Debtor Court that such observation has been made. For, over a century ago, citizens of Boston meeting at the Exchange Coffee House were thus constrained to petition the legislature for the relief of poor creditors: 53. Cf. pp. 578, 579, supra, for study of 146 Poor Debtor bankrupts; of. note 47, supra. 54. In this connection it is to be noted that the Merchant's Credit Bureau, constituting practically all of the larger Boston retail stores, has recently organized its own collection agency. Pathological eases which normally would go to the Poor Debtor Court for colledtion are sent to the Bureau, which employs a special office and field staff for this work.
[Vol. 42 "When we take into consideration the expense that attends the present system, it appears equally evident that it is injurious to creditors as well as oppressive to debtors. It is a matter of record . . . that for the last ten years the amounts collected in the cases of commitments have not been sufficient to defray the costs and expenses; so that the creditors, taken collectively, have been losers by the operation of the law. It has also been estimated that within the last twenty years the costs that have accrued against insolvents have amounted to $1,000,000, which has gone principally into the pockets of the attorneys and commiting officers." 0
The major weakness of the Poor Debtor Court is patently an administrative one. In the interest of both creditor and debtor it is important to determine early in the proceedings the ability of the debtor to pay. In case of inability to pay the debtor should be relieved from the pressure, anxiety, fear, and cost of the present procedure. In case of ability to pay, future income should be budgeted and a funding program initiated which takes cognizance of income, number of dependents, and standards of living. At the present time such procedure occurs only casually and occasionally-depending on the degree of social awareness of a particular judge. Even for such a judge no technique for the accomplishment of these ends is provided. Yet, as has been seen, such problems predominate in the cases and, in effect, submerge the earlier court function of detecting property.
The problem of ascertaining ability to pay and debt funding obviously cannot be properly administered by a judicial body already heavily overtaxed with work. The first step, then, in any reorganization of the Poor Debtor Court would be its separation from the Municipal Court. Instead of being presided over by the several Municipal Court judges, the Poor Debtor Court should be under the supervision of a specially qualified Debt Commissioner. administrative organization there should be available to debtors an opportunity for securing legal advice. Under the present system there is no way for the debtor to receive legal advice as to his rights without employing a lawyer or without having recourse to the Legal Aid Society. This function of informing the debtor of his legal rights is now performed largely by the clerks of the Poor Debtor Court, who perform the task intelligently and with much understanding. But there are situations in which the clerks are powerless to help. There is the case of the wage-earner making twenty-five dollars a week with a family of five, who was being hard pressed by his landlord for nine months back rent. He had various debts totalling $300 and was about to be brought into the Poor Debtor's Court on a judgment. He sought advice from the clerk's office as to whether he should go into bankruptcy or whether he might take the Poor Debtor's oath. Now the Poor Debtor's oath, 5 which once might have granted him relief, has been abolished. And the present statute affords no relief to a debtor unless he is first brought into court on a judgment. If the debtor's landlord ties up his salary, as he has threatened, it means loss of job. If his judgment is brought into court, he will be unable to pay. On which horn of the dilemma shall he turn? The clerks cannot give advice here. For the most part they are not lawyers, nor are they officially permitted to impart legal advice. Shall the debtor be sent to the Legal Aid Society? But he is already in despair from having been pushed from one office to another. In any event it seems a denial of justice that a poor debtor should be driven to employ a lawyer, or forced to resort to the legal aid society, to get as a charity", as Dean Pound has well said, "what the state customary to engage counsel to assist the court in the preparation of adequate sociological data pertaining to the case under consideration.
58. Before the adoption of the present supplementary process statute (ACTS (1927) c. 334) by proving on oath that he had no property to the amount of :$20 with which to satisfy the creditor's judgment, a debtor could be discharged from his( indebtedness. The first appearance of a poor debtor's oath in Massachusetts was in 1698 when it was provided that a prisoner might petition the justices of the peace to bring his body without delay not over a mile from the prison, and to certify "the cause and causes of the imprisonment". Each prisoner coming before a justice was administered an oath substantially the same as the late poor debtor oath, but under the colonial statute notwithstanding the oath, the creditor could have the prisoner kept in jail for three months upon furnishing support. See THE ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OV IASSACHUsFrTs BAY, (Vols. 1-4, Boston, 1869) Acts 1698, c. 11, § § 1-8. Under the former Poor Debtor Laws the proper administration of the poor debtor's oath, charges of fraud by the creditor, the default of the creditor after the administering of the oath, etc., gave rise to a considerable body of law. For a dis--cussion of the problems and a collection of cases, see GRINNELL, op. *it. 81pc note 45.
[. ¥01. 42: should give as a right." r9 In short, then, there is a need for an official bureau attached to the Poor Debtor Court which would be readily available for the poor debtor in need of legal advice.
In passing, it is well to reiterate again the need for flexibility and informality in the hearings. The present method of oral examination of the debtor by the creditor's attorney is little less than useless. For even the unskilled lawyer has the debtor at an advantage, and the formality of the procedure to a debtor not represented by counsel may be a terrifying experience. It would seem advisable for the Commissioner to take the initiative in examining the debtor with counsel presenting the evidence concerning the debtor's ability to pay.
Where the judgment debtor has more than one creditor, the Commissioner should have power to summon the creditors and pro-rate the debt; where instalment payments are desirable and feasible the Clerk of Court should serve as trustee as is done in the Ohio courts0C But the device for pro-rating and instalment payment of debts under the Commissioner's trusteeship should be available to any debtor (i.e., other than judgment debtors already in court on supplementary proceedings) owing not less than $50 and not more than $1,000, who voluntarily petition the Commissioner of their desire to pay off their debts. 61 The Commissioner should make possible the marshalling of the debtor's assets to a quick liquidation with creditors; where there are no assets, and it has been determined that the debtor has no present ability to pay, to dismiss the proceedings. As was seen in the previous sections, one of the causes for frequent continuances of the proceedings, and the use of the capias as a collection club, is the ability of the creditor's attorney to arrange with the debtor for a basis of instalment payments outside court. It would seem desirable that there should be compulsory and systematic hearings before the Commissioner on every order for instalment payments with sufficient flexibility provided for a settlement with the creditor on the basis of a part payment and readjustments or a moratorium when needed. But no penalty should be imposed for mere failure to pay in full or in part by non-judgment debtors who have availed themselves of the Commissioner's trusteeship. In order to facilitate the hearings which, under the present judicial procedure, are time consuming for creditor and debtor alike, the Clerk of the Poor Debtor Court should be given power to pass on motions and petitions (as is done by the Clerk of the Superior Equity Court). There should be reserved for 60. See note 9, supra. 61. Ibid.
